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ARTICLE 
CONSENT THEORY AS A POSSIBLE CURE 
FOR UNCONSCIONABLE TERMS IN 
STUDENT-ATHLETE CONTRACTS  
THOMAS A. BAKER III∗ 
 JOHN GRADY∗∗ 
JESSE M. RAPPOLE∗∗∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“One of the most hateful acts of the ill-famed Roman tyrant Caligula 
 was that of having the laws inscribed upon pillars so high that the people 
 could not read them.”1 
 
A door opens and a group of college student-athletes is herded into a room 
with the rest of their teammates where they are presented with standard-form 
contracts and the mandate that they either sign the documents or forfeit the 
opportunity to compete in National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
events for the upcoming academic year.  The student-athletes have no legal 
representation.  There is no negotiation about the terms of the contract.  The 
contracts that these students (some still minors) are about to sign are take-it-
or-leave-it and include much more than just the simple terms of their athletic-
based academic scholarships (e.g., attend class, make good grades, practice, 
and play for their team).  They also include the release of important 
commercial rights like the right of publicity in their names and likenesses for 
perpetuity.  Some of these terms are buried in the text of the documents placed 
before the student-athletes; others are incorporated into the documents by 
reference to NCAA rules and regulations.  This scene takes place in some 
form or another every year on the campus of each NCAA member institution. 
The quote from Justice Musmanno serves as an example of judicial 
 
∗  Assistant Professor in the Sport Management & Policy Program at the University of Georgia. 
∗∗ Associate Professor in the Department of Sport & Entertainment Management at the 
University of South Carolina. 
∗∗∗ Graduate instructor in the Sport Management & Policy Program at the University of Georgia. 
1. Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 97 A.2d 234, 237 (Pa. 1953) (opinion by Musmanno, J.). 
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disapproval directed at take-it-or-leave-it contracts with unclear or hidden 
terms and conditions.  But does that statement fit the take-it-or-leave-it 
agreements put before student-athletes?  Admittedly, it would be unfair to 
liken the treatment and regulation of student-athletes to that of ancient Romans 
under the rule of Caligula.2  Nonetheless, universities enjoy an enormous 
advantage in terms of bargaining power that allows them to dictate terms and 
conditions to student-athletes, who have no real voice in the negotiation.  Not 
only do student-athletes lack equal bargaining power, they lack meaningful 
choice because if they do not agree to the terms put before them, they are 
declared ineligible to participate in intercollegiate athletic competitions 
sanctioned by the NCAA.  Lack of choice is contractually problematic because 
the essence of contract is volition (free exercise of will).3  Contractual volition 
is undermined when one party enjoys an enormous bargaining advantage, 
permitting the stronger party to dictate the terms of the contract to the weaker 
party.4  The absence of contractual volition in an agreement could result in 
judicial use of the doctrine of unconscionability to prevent enforcement of the 
challenged contractual term(s).  This begs the question: Do student-athletes 
lack volition in their contractual relationships with universities to the point that 
these contracts should be found unconscionable if challenged in court? 
This study analyzes that question by examining the doctrine of 
unconscionability and how it could apply to the contractual permission for use 
of name and likeness that student-athletes provide the NCAA and its member 
institutions.  The study includes analysis of the doctrine of unconscionability, 
with specific emphasis placed on the application of consent theory of 
unconscionability to the name and likeness provisions in student-athlete 
agreements.  Specifically, this study applies the consent theory approach to the 
waiver of publicity rights in Part IV of Form 11-3a to examine how the NCAA 
and its member institutions can better protect this contract and its terms and 
conditions from unconscionability claims brought by student-athletes.   
II. DEVELOPMENT OF UNCONSCIONABILITY, FROM COVERT TOOL TO 
CODIFICATION 
The roots of the doctrine of unconscionability can be traced back over 
centuries to the equity of redemption.5  Some even suggest that the doctrine 
 
2. Caligula was the agnomen for Gaius Julius Caesar Augustus Germanicus, the third Roman 
Emperor who had a reputation for being a cruel, extravagant, and perverse tyrant.  See generally 
ANTHONY A. BARRETT, CALIGULA: THE CORRUPTION OF POWER (1989). 
3. JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 482 (3d ed. 1990).  
4. Id. 
5. John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 28 (1969); 
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dates back to the Aristotelian ideal that justice required equality in contractual 
exchange.6  Yet, despite its ancient lineage in equity, the doctrine did not serve 
as a contractual limitation until the creation of Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.) section 2-302 by Karl Llewellyn in the first version of Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code.7  Prior to section 2-302, unconscionable 
contracts and clauses were “surreptitiously invalidated” by courts through the 
use of covert tools.8  The term “covert tools” described methods used by 
courts to achieve equitable results by “knocking over” oppressive agreements 
without having to find them unconscionable.9  These covert methods took the 
form of strained contractual interpretations or manipulations of traditional 
contractual doctrines.10  
Courts resorted to covert methods that concealed the doctrine of 
unconscionability rather than a direct and express approach so as not to 
interfere with freedom of contract.11  A tension has always existed between 
the idea that society should protect its people from the potentially harsh effects 
of an unchecked market system and the concept of freedom of contract, 
“which has long been basic to our socioeconomic system.”12  Pulling in one 
direction is the belief that a free enterprise system requires courts to delegate 
legislation to contracting parties absent a finding of fraud or a violation of 
public policy.13  Pulling in the other direction is the belief that courts exist to 
administer justice and should have the power to refuse enforcement of the 
literal meaning of written documents when such enforcement would lead to 
unjust results.14   
With covert tools, courts attempted to find balance between these two 
 
see also United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“Does any principle in our law have more universal application than the doctrine that 
courts will not enforce transactions in which the relative positions of the parties are such that one has 
unconscionably taken advantage of the necessities of the other?”). 
6. See James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business, 
88 Calif. L. Rev. 1815 (2000).  See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety 
Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73 (2006). 
7. See Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion and 
Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123, 152 (2005). 
8. John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 934 
(1969). 
9. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 486. 
10. See Murray, supra note 5, at 17, 28–29. 
11. See Spanogle, supra note 8, at 934. 
12. Rowe v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 385 N.E.2d 566, 569 (N.Y. 1978). 
13. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629 (1943). 
14. Murray, supra note 5, at 2. 
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competing interests by administering justice without the use of an express 
doctrine that threatened contractual freedom.  Over time, it became very 
evident that the stretching, misconstruing, and abusing of legal doctrines by 
courts in covert tools cases clouded the application of those doctrines.15  For 
example, courts applied concepts like mutuality and consideration to resolve 
cases that they would not traditionally have been used.16  If precedent from 
covert tools cases only controlled unconscionable contract cases, then it could 
have been argued that their equitable ends justified the legal means.  However, 
covert tools cases did not mention unconscionability, and as a result, they 
distorted the general application of the legal doctrines relied upon by the 
courts.17  Covert tools cases also sent mixed signals to litigants.  Parties with 
form contracts that were rejected by courts through the use of covert tools 
were provided with incentives to fix purported, rather than actual, contractual 
problems.18  As a result, drafters would remedy unconscionable form contracts 
by making them longer, more technical, and harder for the nondrafting party to 
comprehend.19 
The problems associated with the skewing of legal doctrine led Llewellyn 
to opine that “[c]overt tools are never reliable tools”20 and prompted the 
creation of an explicit tool in U.C.C. section 2-302.  The U.C.C. was the 
product of a collaborative effort from the American Law Institute and the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to establish 
unified rules, standards, and norms for commercial transactions and 
dealings.21  Article 2 of the U.C.C. governs the sale of consumer goods, and it 
is within this Article that section 2-302 codifies unconscionability.22  As Chief 
Reporter of Article 2, Llewellyn is credited as the architect of section 2-302.23  
In its entirety, the section provides 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time 
 





20. K. N. Llewellyn, Book Reviews, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939) (reviewing O. 
PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL 
LAW (1937)). 
21. HENRY D. GABRIEL & LINDA J. RUSCH, THE ABCS OF THE UCC (REVISED) ARTICLE 2: 
SALES 1 (Amelia H. Boss ed., 2004). 
22. Louisiana is the only state that has not adopted some form of Article 2.  
23. Schmitz, supra note 6, at 85. 
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it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it 
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of 
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable 
result.  
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract 
or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall 
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to 
its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in 
making the determination.24 
Llewellyn viewed this section as providing courts with a mandate to police 
contracts so as to protect against unconscionable bargains.25  Absent from the 
section is a workable application for unconscionability.  For this reason, 
Professor Arthur Leff criticized section 2-302 as providing nothing more than 
“an emotionally satisfying incantation” that says “nothing with words.”26  
However, Llewellyn never intended to provide certainty, stability, or even 
predictability through the creation of section 2-302.27  In fact, Llewellyn 
believed that a statutory approach to unconscionability was “dubious, 
uncertain, and likely to be both awkward in manner and deficient or spotty in 
scope.”28  Instead, Llewellyn wanted the section to serve as a catalyst for the 
creation of an analytical structure of unconscionability.29  Llewellyn intended 
for the judiciary to erect the structure for unconscionability, and that is why 
section 2-302 commands courts to resolve unconscionability issues, even 
though decisions would require factual determinations.30  The section was 
designed to coerce courts away from the use of covert tools and charge them 
with the power and responsibility to develop reliable tools under the heading 
of unconscionability.31   
 
24. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2011). 
25. See William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1967). 
26. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—the Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. 
L. REV. 485, 558–59 (1967) [hereinafter Leff, the Emperor’s New Clause]. 
27. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 487. 
28. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960). 
29. Murray, supra note 5, at 37 (also stating that section 2-302 was the “first footstep on the 
distant analytical planet.”). 
30. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 487. 
31. Murray, supra note 5, at 36–37 (“The [s]ection does not provide the machinery; it will lead 
courts to that machinery, machinery which courts themselves must create.”  Id. at 36.); see also 
U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt.1 (1972). 
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Like the provision, the official comments to U.C.C. section 2-302 do 
nothing to clarify the meaning of unconscionability.  They do, however, 
provide courts with some modicum of guidance for applying the section.  
Comment 1 provides that courts should consider the general commercial 
background and commercial needs of the case in determining whether 
challenged clauses are so one-sided at the time of contract formation as to be 
rendered unconscionable.32  The comment calls for courts to use the section to 
prevent “oppression and unfair surprise” while being careful not to disturb the 
“allocation of risks” that result from “superior bargaining power.”33  The 
comment makes clear that superior bargaining power alone will not provide 
the basis for “oppression” or “unfair surprise.”34  The existence of those 
elements turns on whether the party with superior power operated in a 
commercially reasonable manner and with good faith.35  Comment 2 permits 
courts to refuse the enforcement of the entire contract or to strike clauses 
individually or in groups.36  This allows courts to enforce contracts sans the 
unconscionably defective terms or conditions.   
Article 2 of the U.C.C. only governs contracts for the sale of consumer 
goods, but courts have extended section 2-302’s application to other types of 
contracts.37  Professor Allen E. Farnsworth, reporter for the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, reinforced the extension of section 2-302 with the 
recognition of unconscionability as a basis for contract limitation in section 
208 of the Restatement.38  The Restatement version replicates its U.C.C. 
predecessor in that it does not define unconscionability.  Instead, it recognizes 
that courts have discretionary power to render contracts or terms of contracts 
unconscionable if they were so at the time they were made.39  Section 208 has 
general application to all contracts.   
III. THE BIFURCATION OF THE DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION TO 
CONTRACTS OF ADHESION 
The previous section made mention of Professor Leff’s criticism of the 
lack of clarity provided by section 2-302.  Leff penned that criticism in 
arguably the most significant article ever written on the doctrine of 
 
32. U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt. 1. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Murray, supra note 5, at 41. 
36. U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt. 2. 
37. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 489. 
38. Id. 
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
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unconscionability, Unconscionability and the Code: the Emperor’s New 
Clause.40  It was in that seminal article that Leff introduced the concepts of 
procedural and substantive unconscionability.  The majority of courts have 
adopted Leff’s bifurcation of unconscionability and apply the doctrine to only 
those cases in which elements of both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability are proven.41  Courts have attempted to identify factors 
necessary for finding unconscionability with little success.42  Even in those 
jurisdictions, the factors are either procedural or substantive in nature.43  
Accordingly, it is necessary to analyze both concepts and the elements that 
guide courts in applying them to a given set of facts.   
A.  Procedural Unconscionability 
Procedural unconscionability refers to what Leff called “bargaining 
naughtiness” and occurs when a party uses superior bargaining power 
unreasonably to take advantage of the weaker party to the contract.44  This 
prong is typically found when the imbalance of power is so great that the 
weaker party to the transaction is unable to negotiate the terms of the 
agreement.45  These take-it-or-leave-it contracts are often called “contracts of 
adhesion.”  The model example of an adhesion contract, as defined by Rakoff, 
meets the following seven criteria:46 (1) the document at issue is a printed 
form containing many terms and claims to be a contract; (2) one party to the 
transaction drafted the form, or it was drafted on their behalf; (3) the drafting 
party routinely uses the form in numerous transactions; (4) the form is 
presented to the adhering party for entrance into the transaction only on the 
terms contained in the document, with limited exceptions, through explicit or 
implicit representation understood by the adherent; (5) the adherent signs the 
document after dickering over terms open to bargaining; (6) the adhering 
party, in comparison with the drafting party, enters into few transactions of the 
type represented; and (7) the principal obligation of the adhering party in the 
 
40. See generally Leff, the Emperor’s New Clause, supra note 26. 
41. Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An 
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1073 (2006); see also Maxwell v. 
Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51 (Ariz. 1995). 
42. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 492 (stating that these “blunderbuss efforts” are inconsistent and 
do not provide any meaningful or workable analysis for unconscionability). 
43. See Wille v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976) (providing a ten-factor test for 
procedural and substantive unconscionability). 
44. Leff, the Emperor’s New Clause, supra note 26, at 487. 
45. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 491. 
46. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1174, 1177 (1983). 
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transaction considered as a whole is the payment of money.47  Although courts 
have found contracts of adhesion that do not meet all the criteria listed, 
Rakoff’s model outlines the indicators that courts have used to find contractual 
adhesion.   
The lack of genuine choice in contracts of adhesion calls into question 
whether the weaker party’s signature on the contract manifested true assent.48  
The potential for absence of assent is even more pronounced in employment 
contracts or when the subject of the contract is necessary to the physical and 
economic well-being of the buyer, who cannot procure the item elsewhere in 
the relevant market absent the clause.49  The abuse of power in procedurally 
defective agreements can rise to such a degree that it resembles something like 
duress, referred to as “quasi duress.”50 
Procedural unconscionability also exists when the drafting party abuses 
the negotiation by interfering with the nondrafting party’s understanding of the 
contractual terms.  This lack of knowledge or understanding results in the type 
of unfair surprise proscribed in comment 1 to section 2-302.  It is necessary to 
note that the doctrine of unconscionability does not protect those who do not 
reasonably inform themselves as to the terms of the agreements that they 
sign.51  However, the doctrine has been used to guard against the “bargaining 
naughtiness” found in contracts that contain inconspicuous clauses that result 
in the assumption of unexpected risks.52  For example, courts have found that 
procedural unconscionability is present in the hiding of contract terms in a 
mass of fine print trivia.53  Drafting parties can also unfairly interfere with the 
nondrafting party’s understanding by phrasing contract terms in language that 
is incomprehensible to a layperson or in a way that diverts attention away from 
shifts in material risks.54  The concealment of risk-shifting terms can be so 
great that it “bears a strong resemblance to fraud.”55  In reviewing cases 
alleging this type of bargaining naughtiness, courts have gone beyond the 
contractual terms and looked to the nondrafting party’s age, education, 
intelligence, business acumen, and experience to determine whether that party 
 
47. Id. 




52. Id. at 18. 
53. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
54. Wille, 549 P.2d at 907. 
55. Vigil v. Sears Nat’l Bank, 205 F. Supp. 2d 566, 572–73 (E.D. La. 2002). 
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could have reasonably known or understood the terms of the agreement.56  
Further, emphasis is placed on whether the contractual terms at controversy 
were explained to the weaker party.57  The unfair surprise found in this second 
type of procedural defect also compromises the consent requirement of 
contract formation.  Parties do not truly consent to risk-shifting clauses that 
were unknown to them at the time of contract formation.  The idea that courts 
should protect parties from procedurally unconscionable contracts is consistent 
with classical will theories of contractual obligation because both types of 
procedural defects threaten contractual volition.58   
B.  Substantive Unconscionability 
Substantive unconscionability is the more controversial of Leff’s concepts 
and concerns what he called the “evils in the resulting contract.”59  The 
substantive component of unconscionability requires courts to focus on the 
fairness of the contract terms to protect against unreasonably oppressive 
obligations.60  Oppression exists when contracts deny the nondrafting party of 
basic rights or remedies or when terms result in an overall imbalance of 
obligations and rights imposed by the contract.61  However, this is a very 
intrusive determination that can serve as an “invitation to disrespect the 
parties’ autonomy.”62  After all, should the unconscionability machine be used 
to disrupt a nondrafting party’s right to consent to what the court perceives to 
be an unreasonable bargain?  The intrusive nature of substantive 
unconscionability inquiries tends to offend those who believe that courts 
 
56. See Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976); accord Konica Minolta 
Bus. Solutions, U.S.A., Inc. v. Allied Office Prods., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d. 861 (S.D. Ohio 2010); 
High v. Capital Senior Living Props. 2 — Heatherwood, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. Mich. 2008); 
Vistein v. Am. Registry of Radiologic Technologists, 509 F. Supp. 2d 666 (N.D. Ohio 2007); Doe v. 
SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d. 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007); In re “Apollo” Air Passenger Computer 
Reservation Sys., 720 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Maxwell, 907 P.2d 51; Hutcherson v. Sears 
Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).  
57. Johnson, 415 F. Supp. at 268. 
58. Schmitz, supra note 6, at 92; see also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 272 (1986) (stating that “will theories” is a name given to a classical set of 
theories based on the belief that contracts should be enforced because the promisor has chosen, or 
willed, to be bound by the bargain).  
59. Leff, the Emperor’s New Clause, supra note 26, at 487. 
60. Schmitz, supra note 6, at 92. 
61. Wille, 549 P.2d at 907 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. 
Cir. 1965)); accord Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1983); Millett v. 
Truelink Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D. Del. 2008).  
62. Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable Remedies and Principled Discretion: The Michigan 
Experience, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 609, 634 (1997). 
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should not interfere with contractual terms absent a finding of fraud or 
violation of public policy.  Some in that number have questioned the 
appropriateness of substantive inquires altogether, while others insist that 
cases should be limited to instances where it is proved that terms are so one-
sided as to “‘shock the judgment of a person of good sense’” with terms so 
unreasonable that “‘no man in his senses and not under delusion” would make 
and “no honest and fair man would accept.’”63 
C.  Balancing Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability 
Perhaps the biggest problem posed by bifurcated unconscionability is in 
the need for finding both types of unconscionability in a given case.  
Specifically, what should a court do with a contract that was corrupted by only 
one of the two concepts?  Can an agreement survive an unconscionability 
attack if the terms are reasonable but the negotiations were procedurally 
defective?  Conversely, should a court find unconscionable an oppressively 
one-sided agreement that was entered into freely and the product of extensive 
negotiation between two sophisticated contracting parties?  These and other 
questions concerning the application of unconscionability were addressed in 
an extensive study by DiMatteo and Rich in which 187 cases64 were analyzed 
to empirically examine how courts apply the doctrine.65  The results of this 
study revealed an “overwhelming judicial belief” that evidence of both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability is needed to knock over an 
otherwise enforceable contract.66  Although, the results also found that the 
majority of jurisdictions recognized that the threshold needed to prove both 
types of unconscionability is not fixed.67  Instead, courts may apply a 
balancing approach (or sliding scale approach) in which a substantial amount 
of one form of unconscionability can offset a much lesser amount of the 
other.68  This leads to the primary research question addressed by this study: 
How would a balancing or sliding scale approach for procedural and 
substantive unconscionability apply to the release of publicity rights by 
student-athletes in form contracts with NCAA member institutions?   
 
63. Grady v. Grady, 504 A.2d 444, 446–47 (R.I. 1986) (quoting Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 
406 (1889)); see also Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 353 (Ct. App. 
1999); Am. Software, Inc. v. Ali, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 482 (Ct. App. 1996). 
64. DiMatteo and Rich pulled cases from two eras: (1) first generation U.C.C. section 2-302 
cases (1968–1980), and (2) second generation U.C.C. section 2-302 cases (1991–2003). 
65. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 41, at 1092–93. 
66. Id. at 1073; see also Schmitz, supra note 6, at 91 (discussing the sliding scale approach to 
procedural and substantive unconscionability).  
67. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 41, at 1074. 
68. Id. 
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IV. APPLICATION OF UNCONSCIONABILITY TO STUDENT-ATHLETE 
AGREEMENTS 
In order to analyze the arguments related to finding currently utilized 
student-athletes’ eligibility agreements as potentially unconscionable, a better 
understanding of the various agreements that the student-athletes must sign in 
order to be eligible to compete is needed.  Understanding the context that these 
so-called “promotional uses” involving student-athletes might appear is also 
necessary to appreciate the complexity of the current phenomenon.  The use of 
student-athletes’ names and likenesses by their respective universities has 
gradually evolved over time from strictly promotional uses (trading cards, 
team jerseys) to blatantly commercial uses (video games, fantasy sports).69  
Current uses of student-athletes’ likenesses, most notably in EA Sports video 
games, parallel the video games produced for their counterparts in the 
professional sport leagues, albeit without use of players’ names, and revive 
new legal concerns without clear answers.70   
Pursuant to the NCAA’s constitution, bylaws, and regulations, students are 
not allowed to play intercollegiate sports unless they meet all NCAA 
requirements.71  “Courts have recognized the National Letter of Intent (“NLI”) 
and the Statement of Financial Aid as the two main documents that form a 
contract between the student-athlete and the university or college.”72  In 
addition, “As a general matter, courts have found that the NCAA Constitution 
and Bylaws constitute a contract between the NCAA and member schools and 
the student-athlete.”73  The court in Oliver v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n found that “[a] contractual relationship was formed by the plaintiff’s 
 
69. John Grady et al., Opportunities and Limitations in Licensing Student-Athlete Likenesses in 
NCAA Proposed Bylaw No. 2010-26, Presentation at the Scholarly Conference on College Sport (Apr. 
21, 2011);  see also James S. Thompson, Comment, University Trading Cards: Do College Athletes 
Enjoy a Common Law Right to Publicity?, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 143 (1994); Vladimir P. Belo, 
The Shirts Off Their Backs: Colleges Getting Away with Violating the Right of Publicity, 19 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133 (1996); Matthew G. Matzkin, Gettin’ Played: How the Video 
Game Industry Violates College Athletes’ Rights of Publicity by Not Paying for Their Likenesses, 21 
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 227 (2001); Nando Di Fino, College Football Fantasy Game to Name 
Names, WALL ST. J. SPORTS (July 31, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12173367981 
9593215.html. 
70. Grady et al., supra note 69.  
71. Oliver v. NCAA, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 8, 14 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Erie Cnty. 2008).  See also Sean 
Hanlon & Ray Yasser, “J.J. Morrison” and His Right of Publicity Lawsuit Against the NCAA, 15 
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 241, 275 n.217 (2008); Kristal S. Stippich & Kadence A. Otto, Carrying a 
Good Joke Too Far? An Analysis of the Enforceability of Student-Athlete Consent to Use of Name & 
Likeness, 20 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 151, 157 n.32 (2010). 
72. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 71, at 283. 
73. Stippich & Otto, supra note 71, at 157 n.32. 
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status as an intended third-party beneficiary between the NCAA and [the 
member institution].”74  “The plaintiff, who is not a party to the contract 
between NCAA and [the member institution], stands to benefit from the 
contract’s performance, and thus he acquires rights under the contract as well 
as the ability to enforce the contract once those rights have vested.”75  In 
regard to the NCAA and student-athletes, “courts have consistently 
determined that the athletic scholarship is a contract, and thus recognize a 
student-athlete’s right to assert a breach of contract action against the college 
institution.”76  Thus, it can be presumed that a contract exists between the 
NCAA, the academic institution, and the student-athlete.77 
Of focal interest to this article is Part IV of Form 11-3a related to 
“Promotion of NCAA Championships, Events, Activities or Programs.”78  The 
language of Part IV requires the student-athlete to authorize the NCAA—or a 
third party acting on behalf of the NCAA (e.g., host institution, conference, 
and local organizing committee)—to use the student-athlete’s name or picture 
to generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities, 
or programs.  It is required to be signed each year by the student-athlete prior 
to competition.  This particular part of the student-athlete eligibility forms has 
been the subject of increased scrutiny by legal and sport management 
scholars.79  The scrutiny has been centered on the waiver of the amateur 
student-athlete’s right to publicity in perpetuity.  Under the current system, by 
signing Part IV of Form 11-3a, the student-athlete not only permits the 
university, their athletic conference, and the NCAA to use their name or 
picture to promote NCAA events, they also are compelled to simultaneously 
assign the rights to use their name and likeness to their respective universities 
who can subsequently license the rights to others for arguably promotional 
purposes.80  Because the terms of the NCAA eligibility forms cannot be 
negotiated or altered in any way, student-athletes ostensibly cannot opt out of 
 
74. Oliver, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d at 13.   
75. Id. at 13–14. 
76. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 71, at 281; see, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 
416 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972). 
77. Stippich & Otto, supra note 71, at 157 n.32. 
78. See Appendix 1: Form 11-3a (irrelevant sections omitted). 
79. See Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 71; Stippich & Otto, supra note 71; Anastasios Kaburakis 
et al., NCAA Student-Athletes’ Rights of Publicity, EA Sports, and the Video-Game Industry, 27 ENT. 
& SPORTS LAW. 1 (2009); John Grady & Sam Arthur, Predicting the Future of Licensing Student-
Athletes’ Likenesses after Keller and O’Bannon, Presentation at the 2010 Scholarly Conference on 
College Sport (Apr. 23, 2010); Grady et al., supra note 69; Richard M. Southall, College Athletes’ 
Image Rights: The State of the Game, Presentation at the Craig Kelly Sport and Entertainment Law 
Symposium (Nov. 13, 2009). 
80. Grady & Arthur, supra note 79. 
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their inclusion in certain promotional (commercial) activities.  This creates 
fundamental problems with the current licensing scheme.81  Because student-
athletes essentially assign the right to license their name and picture (i.e., 
image and likeness) to their university, the student-athlete has “no meaningful 
choice” in determining the types of promotional materials or commercial 
products on which his or her name or image is used.82  In addition, “the 
athlete . . . may well have no knowledge or awareness that his or her 
reputation, image or name is being used for these commercial purposes.”83 
While the current system whereby universities acquire the rights to their 
student-athletes names and likenesses for promotional purposes seems grossly 
unfair to the student-athlete and very lopsided in favor of the member 
institutions,84 is there a remedy available in contract law for these student-
athletes?  The answer is complicated given the current state of the law with 
regard to both contract law and recent state law decisions related to right of 
publicity involving student-athletes.  In looking to the law of contracts for an 
answer, it is clear that in order for a student-athlete to state a claim for breach 
of contract against his or her university, the student-athlete “must point to an 
identifiable contractual promise that the [university] failed to honor.”85  
However, because the student-athlete cannot “negotiate, change, or delete any 
of the provisions”86 in his or her athletic scholarship agreement and must 
agree to the boilerplate contractual terms that are identical for all student-
athletes, this “has the effect of eliminating a student-athlete’s capability to 
assert a contractual claim based on a failure to perform implied promises”87  
The student-athlete is therefore left to seek an alternative remedy in contract 
law or in equity.  One such remedy is to utilize the unconscionability doctrine 
to invalidate all or part of the agreement.   
To prevail on an unconscionability claim, the student-athlete plaintiff must 
establish the following: “(1) an inequality of bargaining power between the 
institution granting the athletic scholarship and the student-athlete, (2) a lack 
of meaningful choice or alternative for the student-athlete, (3) supposedly 
agreed-upon terms hidden or concealed in the contract, and (4) terms that 
 
81. Id.  
82. Laura Freedman, Note, Pay or Play? The Jeremy Bloom Decision and NCAA Amateurism 
Rules, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 697 (2003). 
83. Southall, supra note 79. 
84. Grady & Arthur, supra note 79. 
85. Ross, 957 F.2d at 417. 
86. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 71, at 292. 
87. Id. at 283 (discussing the possible existence of implied promises to protect student-athletes 
from commercial exploitation). 
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unreasonably favor the institution.”88  As discussed in Part III of this paper, 
cases of unconscionability typically require some combination of procedural 
unconscionability and substantive unconscionability.89  Furthermore, it is 
generally accepted that if more of one of the categories is present, then less of 
the other is required.90  Thus, use of a balancing or sliding scale approach, in 
which a substantial amount of one category of unconscionability can offset a 
much lesser amount of the other,91 may offer the most promise for student-
athletes asserting unconscionability related to the release of publicity rights in 
the form contracts student-athletes enter into with their universities.   
A.  Arguments in Favor of Procedural Unconscionability 
Procedural unconscionability focuses on whether there was oppression or 
unfair surprise present at the time of contract formation.92  In determining 
whether there was “oppression,” the court must determine if, as a result of 
signing Part IV of Form 11-3a, which requires the student-athlete to waive the 
right to the use of his or her name and likeness as a condition of athletic 
eligibility and, in effect, assigns this licensing right to their respective 
university so that the university may engage in undefined “promotional 
purposes,” there is “an inequality of bargaining power resulting in no 
meaningful choice for the weaker party.”93  Because student-athletes all must 
sign the same standardized “boilerplate” agreement and cannot alter its terms 
in any way, there is a persuasive argument that oppression exists.   
Additionally, as noted by the court in Williams v. Walker-Thomas 
Furniture Co., “In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by 
a gross inequality of bargaining power.”94  In the case of the contracts 
between student-athletes and their university, the gross inequality of 
bargaining power of any university, much less one with an elite athletics 
program, given their dominant position and vast experience related to 
contractual matters involving athletics and licensing, is clear when compared 
to the (lack of) knowledge and experience of contracts and business matters 
that an eighteen-year-old (if not a seventeen-year-old in some cases) freshman 
student-athlete would even remotely possess.  Stippich and Otto highlighted 
that the freshmen student-athletes are “the weaker party susceptible to 
 
88. Id. at 291. 
89. Id. at 289. 
90. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.28 at 585 (3d ed. 2004). 
91. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 41, at 1074. 
92. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 71, at 289. 
93. Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2001). 
94. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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persuasion by the NCAA, school administrators, and coaches by virtue of their 
age, lack of knowledge and experience, and need/desire to play intercollegiate 
athletics.”95  The situation is further complicated by the fact that, procedurally 
speaking, the student-athlete most likely signs these forms without the 
assistance of legal counsel and without adequate time to thoroughly review the 
substance of the agreements or comprehend the ramifications of signing such 
documents.  Furthermore, as a practical matter, because the mode used at 
many schools is to have the student-athletes sign these forms in a group or 
team setting,96 described by one student-athlete as a “cattle-call,” it is quite 
possible that the student-athlete is not reading the forms carefully, if at all, 
before signing.   
An additional concern is that student-athletes are likely unaware of the 
legal effects of waiving their right to use of their name and likeness in 
promotional purposes in perpetuity,97 specifically their publicity rights.  
Because the student-athlete cannot “negotiate, change, or delete any of the 
provisions”98 that might benefit himself or herself individually, each student-
athlete must abide by the same rules applicable to all student-athletes 
regarding use of their name and likeness in unspecified promotions.  The only 
realistic option to not signing the forms is to forgo athletic eligibility at an 
NCAA member institution.  Admittedly, the student-athlete does have other 
athletic alternatives besides playing at an NCAA member institution, including 
“scholarship offers by, e.g., National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics 
(“NAIA”) or National Junior College Athletic Association (“NJCAA”) 
member institutions, or the progressively more available options for talented 
young athletes to play in semi-professional leagues both in the United States 
and overseas”99   
However, as noted by Kaburakis et al., “critics protest that this is no 
alternative to the NCAA.”100  This essentially creates a “take-it-or-leave-it” 
proposition for the student-athlete, especially when the myriad types of 
promotional activities currently used by the NCAA and its corporate partners 
not specified in the form seem to be ever-expanding due to technology.  Given 
this complex situation, student-athletes have “no meaningful choice” in 
determining the types of promotional materials or commercial products on 
 
95. Stippich & Otto, supra note 71, at 178. 
96. Id. 
97. Grady & Arthur, supra note 79. 
98. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 71, at 292. 
99. Kaburakis et al., supra note 79, at 18. 
100. Id. 
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which his or her name or image is used.101  Furthermore, as the types of 
promotional purposes that incorporate student-athlete likenesses become more 
commercial in nature (e.g., video games featuring amateur athletes), “the . . . 
athlete may well have no knowledge or awareness that his or her reputation, 
image or name is being used for these commercial purposes.”102 
An alternative to finding oppression would be for the court to find unfair 
surprise.  This requires demonstrating that “the supposedly agreed-upon terms 
are hidden or concealed.”103  Because the language in Part IV of Form 11-3a 
mirrors the language in NCAA Bylaw 12.5 and, in the version of the form 
currently used, now explicitly incorporates Bylaw 12.5 by reference, it can be 
argued that the student-athlete should have some knowledge and familiarity 
with the substance of this specific bylaw before signing the form.  
Furthermore, it is unreasonable to believe that the student-athlete, with little to 
no experience in matters of business, finance, or law in most cases, would 
understand the significance of these terms or the substance or potential value 
of forgoing the publicity rights at issue.  This is particularly true given that the 
assignment exists in perpetuity.  How many of these student-athletes know 
that they are forfeiting use of commercial rights to their names and likeness for 
all eternity?  The rule against perpetuities would disallow this type of 
assignment if the proprietary interests conveyed concerned real property.  So, 
should an assignment of this magnitude be tolerated for a conveyance made by 
a student-athlete who is probably unsophisticated in contracts and unaware of 
the legal ramifications of commercial transactions?   
As noted by Stippich and Otto,  
[A] student-athlete signing eligibility forms would not 
reasonably expect that he or she signs away valuable publicity 
rights indefinitely to promote commercial endeavors, 
including third party contracts for video games.  Not only 
does such a broad release not have anything to do with 
eligibility to compete in intercollegiate sports . . . but it is 
inconsistent and, indeed, contrary to the main purposes of the 
NCAA contract, which is to uphold the principle of 
amateurism and protect the student-athlete from commercial 
exploitation.104   
 
101. Freedman, supra note 82, at 697. 
102. Southall, supra note 79. 
103. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 71, at 290. 
104. Stippich & Otto, supra note 71, at 165. 
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On balance, however, when compared to the requirements for finding 
oppression, a plaintiff’s ability to establish unfair surprise would be a more 
difficult argument.105 
B.  Arguments in Favor of Substantive Unconscionability 
In order to establish substantive unconscionability, the plaintiff must 
establish that the terms are unreasonably favorable to the member institution.  
Arguments necessary to establish this category of unconscionability include 
the fact that the agreement is “‘one-sided or overly harsh,’”106 and the “‘sum 
total of the provisions of a contract drive too hard a bargain.’”107  The one-
sided nature of standardized form contracts, drafted by experienced lawyers 
for the NCAA who have the benefit of time and expertise, suggests that they 
are drafted in favor of the stronger party.  This creates the current system 
whereby the NCAA requires the student-athletes to forfeit potentially lucrative 
rights and member institutions, and by default the NCAA essentially acquires 
the licensing rights (veiled as a promotional right) for their student-athletes’ 
images.  “[T]here is a striking imbalance in the resulting bargain in that the 
restriction is unfairly one-sided—the student-athlete must forego potential 
rights to profit from its image but the NCAA does not.”108  As noted by Baker 
and Grady,109 the use of Part IV of Form 11-3a to acquire these rights is not 
only grossly unfair to the student-athlete, but also very lopsided in favor of the 
member institutions.  The member institutions and the NCAA subsequently 
have almost unfettered authority to subsequently license these rights, in 
perpetuity, within the boundaries of the ever-evolving interpretation of the 
NCAA bylaws.110  Thus, an argument exists that the grossly one-sided nature 
of Part IV of Form 11-3a evidences the requisite degree of substantive 
unconscionability.  Accordingly, it is possible for a student-athlete plaintiff to 
proffer enough proof of both procedural and substantive unconscionability to 
convince a court that the sliding scale should balance in favor of refusing 
enforcement of the use of likeness provision in Part IV of Form 11-3a. 
 
105. Kaburakis et al., supra note 79. 
106. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 71, at 294 n.352 (quoting State v. Brown, 965 P.2d 1102, 
1110 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998)); see United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 206 
(D. Mass. 1998). 
107. United Cos. Lending Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d at 206 (quoting Waters v. Min Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 
231, 234 (1992)). 
108. Stippich & Otto, supra note 71, at 178. 
109. Thomas A. Baker III & John Grady, That’s Unconscionable! Analyzing the Contractual 
Rights of Student-Athletes, Presentation at the North American Society for Sport Management 
Conference (June 5, 2010). 
110. Id. (emphasis added). 
BAKER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2012  3:41 PM 
636 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:2 
V.  CONSENT THEORY AS ONE POSSIBLE ANSWER 
Whether deemed remote or realistic, there exists a legitimate threat that 
some aspects of student-athlete contracts could be found unconscionable and 
therefore unenforceable.111  This is particularly true for the provision that 
permits the use of student-athletes’ likenesses in perpetuity by their 
universities, the NCAA, and other corporate partners involved in promotional 
uses that include student-athletes’ likenesses.  This begs the question: What 
can NCAA member institutions, and the NCAA, do to better safeguard these 
contracts from an unconscionability challenge?  Perhaps the answer can be 
pulled from Professor Murray’s seminal counter to Leff’s critique, 
Unconscionability: Unconscionability.112  It was in that article that Murray 
presented his consent theory for addressing unconscionability cases.  Murray’s 
consent theory challenges the existence of both apparent and genuine assent in 
an agreement.  Although this theory may appear more as a sword for attacking 
unconscionable bargains for want of genuine consent, it may be possible to use 
the theory as a shield by actually enhancing contractual consent.  Recall that 
courts will only invalidate contracts that contain both substantive and 
procedural elements of unconscionability.113  Thus, the use of consent-
enhancing elements in contract formation should insulate a contract from 
unconscionability claims.  To understand the workings of this approach, it is 
necessary to further explore Murray’s consent theory to unconscionability.   
A.  Murray’s Approach: The Three Steps 
Murray recognized that a clause may be the product of apparent, rather 
than true assent, and therefore argued that Leff’s bifurcation did “little but add 
more labels to the increasing number of substitutes for analysis.”114  Instead, 
Murray believed that courts should focus on what he believed was the “true 
aim” of the doctrine, genuine consent.115  In addressing that target, Murray 
created a three-step approach.  The first step addressed apparent assent and 
sought to determine the apparent allocation of risk.  The second step focused 
on the materiality of the risk to discern if a substantial burden would be 
imposed through enforcement.  The third step called for verification of assent 
to determine whether apparent assent reflected true assent.  The first and the 
third steps require further elaboration because they provide possible guidance 
 
111. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 71, at 296. 
112. See generally Murray, supra note 5. 
113. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 41, at 1073, 1110. 
114. Murray, supra note 5, at 21. 
115. Id.  
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to NCAA member institutions in dealing with student-athletes.  The second 
step, assessment of materiality, does not.  After all, the materiality of terms 
and conditions, like use of likeness, is not subject to modification by parties in 
privity.  Accordingly, this article will further limit its focus to the first and 
third steps to Murray’s approach.  In these two sections, suggestions will be 
made for how Form 11-3a is administered to student-athletes.  These 
suggestions are directed at both the NCAA and its member institutions.  The 
member institutions administer the signing of this and other student-athlete 
contracts, but the NCAA is the drafter of Form 11-3a and requires student-
athletes to sign the document as a condition to participation in NCAA-
sanctioned intercollegiate athletics.  Therefore, the NCAA would need to 
participate in amendments to the process of administrating Form 11-3a and 
possible other required eligibility forms as well.  Furthermore, both the NCAA 
and its members would stand to lose the lucrative rights to use of student-
athlete publicity rights if Part IV of Form 11-3a was deemed unconscionable. 
1.  Step One: The Apparent Allocation of Risks 
The first step to Murray’s consent theory approach requires the court to 
examine how the parties reasonably expected to allocate the risks in the 
contract.  Through contract, it is possible for parties to assume both expected 
and unexpected risks.  When risk assumption through contract is reasonable, it 
occurs because: (1) the surrounding circumstances (i.e., trade usage, prior 
course of dealing, or course of performance) indicated that one of the bases of 
the agreement concerned the particular allocation of risks, or because (2) the 
parties have clearly expressed an intention to assume a particular risk.116  The 
typical unconscionability case involves an unreasonable attempt to shift an 
unexpected risk.117  A party to a contract does not assume unexpected risks.118  
So, when one party attempts to alter the normal allocation of risks with the 
contract, that alteration must result from agreement.119  In these situations, 
some greater evidence of assent is needed than mere apparent assent.120  
Otherwise, the risk will not shift if the facts do not indicate that a reasonable 
person would assume such a risk.121  Specifically, shifts of unexpected risks 
should be conspicuous. 
Murray believed that an attempt to shift an inconspicuous unexpected risk 
 
116. Id. at 14. 
117. Id. at 18. 
118. Id. at 16. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 21. 
121. Id. at 17. 
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should be deemed defective and provides the court with a basis to refuse 
enforcement.122  Murray supported this belief with the argument that apparent 
allocations of risk should not include unexpected risks.123  After all, without 
even the appearance of assent, there is no need to determine the existence of 
true assent.124  Murray would classify a failed attempt to shift an unexpected 
risk as procedural and the lack of genuine assent as substantive.125  But, he did 
not value these terms as they do nothing more than add labels to an increasing 
number of substitutes for analysis.126  Thus, a condition precedent must be met 
before unexpected risk-shifting clauses are even apparently enforceable; the 
conspicuousness of the clauses must give rise to the reasonable inference of 
assent.127  
Accordingly, contracts that fail at risk alteration could be deemed per se 
unconscionable because they facially fail to effectively alter the risks between 
the parties.  However, Murray believed it unworkable to set forth a bright-line 
test for courts to use in determining whether unexpected risks have been 
altered by conspicuous contractual terms.128  The guideline proposed by 
Murray is whether a reasonable person in the position of the party against 
whom enforcement would be imposed should have been made aware of the 
risk through the express terms of the contract.129  As a caveat, Murray warned 
that bold-faced print located just above the signature line might not provide a 
reasonable person with the requisite degree of conspicuousness to shift an 
unexpected risk.130  Contractual conspicuousness to Murray was not limited to 
referring “merely . . . to the placement of the clause in the writing.”131  
Instead, the facts surrounding the contract may require an objective search for 
a truer form of apparent assent that focuses on the appearance of 
knowledge.132  However, it is not necessary that the enforcing party provide 
proof of subjective knowledge.  Instead, what is needed is evidence that the 
drafting party made the other aware of the risk alteration.  DiMatteo and Rich 
proposed that this evidence could take the form of clear disclosure (written, 
 
122. Id. at 20. 
123. Id. at 21. 
124. Id.  
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 22. 
128. See generally id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 23. 
131. Id. at 22. 
132. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 41, at 1110. 
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oral, or both) and “signing off”, the process whereby the drafting party has the 
nondrafting party initial clauses found in a contract to evidence that the 
nondrafting party is aware of their existence.133  
The NCAA and its member institutions need to make student-athletes 
aware of the shift in risk found in Part IV of Form 11-3a.  Specifically, they 
should increase the conspicuousness of the conveyance of likeness in the form 
so that those signing it easily understand its terms and conditions.  Murray 
suggests that allegedly unconscionable terms should be analyzed to determine 
whether a reasonable person would be aware of the shift in risk.  Stippich and 
Otto found that student-athletes do not reasonably expect that Form 11-3a 
releases valuable publicity rights indefinitely.134  In fact, they found that 
student-athletes view this document as nothing more than an eligibility 
form.135  This finding is reasonable given that the stated purpose on the form 
is “[t]o assist in certifying eligibility.”136  Furthermore, the form is labeled as 
the “NCAA Division I Student-Athlete Statement/Drug-Testing Consent 
Form.”137  Nowhere in its title or stated purpose is there mention that the form 
concerns the right to use student-athletes’ names and likenesses.  Thus, a 
strong argument could be made that Form 11-3a does not provide even the 
appearance of assent that student-athletes contractually released their publicity 
rights.  This, however, is easy to remedy.   
Form 11-3a should be drafted so that it explains that it is much more than 
just an eligibility and drug-testing consent form; it is an instrument that 
conveys what could prove to be very valuable publicity rights.  Currently, Part 
IV provides that student-athlete likeness could be used to generally “promote 
NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs.”138  
Instead, the form should use very straightforward language to describe the 
nature of this conveyance and the possible uses of a student-athlete’s name 
and likeness by member institutions and the NCAA.  Furthermore, Part IV 
should detail the extent of this permission by describing that this right of use 
exists indefinitely.  This type of contractual alteration would provide the 
necessary appearance of assent needed to establish a consent theory.  
Additionally, it would counter any claim of unfair surprise by student-athletes 
to the use of likeness provision. 
 
133. Id. at 1112.  
134. Stippich & Otto, supra note 71, at 165.  
135. Id. 
136. See Appendix 1: Form 11-3a (irrelevant sections omitted). 
137. See id. 
138. See id. 
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2.  Step Two: Materiality of Risks 
The second step to Murray’s consent theory approach requires courts to 
determine the materiality of the risk that the contract purported to alter.139  
Murray believed materiality to be a better alternative to the use of words like 
“oppressive,” “one-sided,” “indecent,” or even “naughty” for the purpose of 
determining if the shift in risk inflicts enough damage to warrant use of the 
unconscionability doctrine.140  Murray, like Leff before him, recognized that 
these terms required too much subjectivity from the court.141  Conversely, 
Murray suggested use of materiality as a requirement because the Restatement 
already recognizes the existence of materiality and even defines it in section 
275.142  The section provides a list of factors for courts to consider, and from 
that list, Murray emphasized two points: (1) whether the party against whom 
the clause would operate would still obtain the substantial benefit of the 
bargain, and (2) the extent of the hardship on the enforcing party if the court 
refused its application.143 
While it is necessary to discuss the second step to Murray’s approach in 
order to better understand how the totality of the approach works, this step is 
not relevant to the scope of this section of the article.  Recall that this section 
aims to provide an alternative approach for NCAA member institutions in 
better safeguarding student-athlete contracts from unconscionability claims.  
The materiality of a term or condition is not subject to alteration in contract 
formation.  NCAA member institutions may deem the use of student-athletes’ 
likenesses to be immaterial because student-athletes still receive the 
substantial benefit that they bargained for despite the inclusion of the clause.  
However, a reviewing court may disagree, especially given the millions of 
dollars that are made by the NCAA and member institutions off of the use of 
said likeness in video games.  The loss of this use would impose a significant 
financial hardship that student-athletes could use to provide evidence of 
materiality.  Therefore, it is more necessary to focus on the first and third steps 
to Murray’s approach because they provide a guide to consent enhancement. 
3.  Step Three: Verification of Assent  
The first two steps to Murray’s version of the unconscionability machine 
 
139. Murray, supra note 5, at 23. 
140. Id. at 23–24. 
141. Id. at 25; Leff, the Emperor’s New Clause, supra note 26, at 500 (taking issue with the term 
“oppression”). 
142. Murray, supra note 5, at 25. 
143. Id. 
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serve as prerequisites for activating the verification of assent step.  It is in this 
step that the court would need to look past the appearance of assent and 
determine whether the disfavored party had any meaningful choice in the 
matter.144  If volition is the essence of contract,145 then the removal of free 
will from the negotiation should negate the existence of the contract.  The 
problem is that many mass contracts contain take-it-or-leave-it terms or 
conditions.  Murray called for courts to look to the true contractual 
relationship to discern whether genuine assent exists, even in form contracts 
that include take-it-or-leave-it terms or conditions.146  To do this, courts must 
look to the bargaining positions of the parties in light of the subject matter of 
the agreement.147  Specifically, the court must gauge the necessity of the 
subject and whether the disfavored party could obtain that subject matter from 
another source.148  The bargaining power of the disfavored party determines 
how much free choice that party possessed in agreeing to the controversial 
clause.  Accordingly, competition for the commodity at the center of the 
contract controls the degree of bargaining power and the presence of 
meaningful choice.149  If the disfavored party is unable to procure that 
commodity from another purveyor, then the party had no bargaining power 
and consequently, no free choice.150   
Student-athletes have little to no volition in agreeing to Part IV of Form 
11-3a.  The form is a take-it-or-leave-it agreement that must be signed in order 
for the student-athlete to be eligible for intercollegiate competition sanctioned 
by the NCAA.151  If the student-athlete wants an athletic scholarship to 
matriculate at an NCAA institution, the form must be signed and his or her 
publicity rights must be released.  The lack of volition in this negotiation is 
compounded by the fact that there is no reasonable alternative market for 
student-athletes who desire both an education and the opportunity to compete 
at the highest levels of college sports.152  This is also important because the 
 
144. Id. at 28. 
145. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 482. 





151. Michael J. Riella, Note, Leveling the Playing Field: Applying the Doctrines of 
Unconscionability and Condition Precedent to Effectuate Student-Athlete Intent Under the National 
Letter of Intent, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2181, 2212 (2002) (discussing how the student-athlete 
contracts like the National Letter of Intent are not optional for student-athletes who desire to 
participate in “big time” NCAA-sanctioned intercollegiate athletics). 
152.  Hanlon & Yasser, supra 71, at 291–92; see also Thomas A. Baker III et al., White v. 
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NCAA provides future professional athletes for several sports (football and 
men’s and women’s basketball, in particular) with the best opportunity to hone 
and display their athletic skills prior to entering the professional ranks.153  
Some defenders of the NCAA contend that intercollegiate sports offered by 
the NAIA and the NJCAA provide reasonable alternative markets to NCAA 
sports.154  But, a deeper look at relevant market analysis reveals that this is not 
the case.   
The term “relevant market” concerns a market in which one or more goods 
or services compete within a specific geographic area.155  Central to this 
concept is that the goods or services are interchangeable by consumers for the 
same purposes.156  The problem with the defenders’ position is that neither the 
NAIA nor the NJCAA provides a product for student-athletes that can be 
interchanged with the product provided by Division I of the NCAA.  The 
NCAA is split into three divisions (I, II, and III).  Division I is the highest 
division of the NCAA in terms of number of sports offered and quality of 
competition.  The lower two divisions (II and III) are similar to the NAIA and 
NJCAA in that they provide fewer sport opportunities and a drastically lower 
quality of athletic competition.  As a result, programs in neither the NAIA nor 
the NJCAA compete against Division I programs for the same student-
athletes.  At best, an argument could be made that NAIA programs provide a 
reasonable alternative to schools that compete in the lowest divisions of 
NCAA athletics (II and III).157  As for NJCAA institutions, they typically 
serve as outlets for student-athletes who fail to academically qualify for 
NCAA participation.158  Furthermore, the fact that NJCAA schools are two-
year degree programs should render them ineffective to serve as 
interchangeable markets for institutions that provide four-year degree 
 
NCAA: A Chink in the Antitrust Armor, 21 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 75, 86 (2011). 
153.  The collective bargaining agreements for the National Football League (NFL), National 
Basketball Association (NBA), and Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA) all require 
athletes to be one (for the NBA), three (for the NFL) or four (for the WNBA) years removed from 
high school before they are allowed to participate in their professional leagues.  Future professional 
athletes for these leagues are effectively forced to participate in intercollegiate sports or leave the 
country to play professionally.  
154.  Kaburakis et al., supra note 79, at 18. 
155. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956). 
156. Id. 
157. See NCAA and NAIA University Sports Divisions, INTUITION SCHOLARSHIPS, http://www. 
student-scholarships.com/sports-award-scheme/ncaa-naia-sports-divisions.html (last visited Mar. 12, 
2012). 
158. The NCAA sets a minimum test score and grade point average requirement for student-
athletes, while NJCAA programs have open enrollment in that they require no SAT score, ACT score, 
or minimum grade point average.  
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programs because the quality of the degree program is not the same.  Thus, 
there exists no competitor in intercollegiate sports that is interchangeable in 
terms of quality of athletic competition and quality of education with Division 
I of the NCAA.   
Those same critics also contest that semi-professional leagues and 
overseas professional sports leagues provide relevant markets for would-be 
student-athletes who elect against signing Form 11-3a.159  This position is also 
flawed.  First, neither of these two opportunities offers educational degree 
programs for students, and this alone should remove them from the reasonable 
alternative market analysis.  Second, semi-professional sports in the United 
States provide a product that in no way resembles NCAA intercollegiate 
athletics in terms of quality of competition or media exposure.  As a result, 
these leagues are not scouted by professional talent evaluators for professional 
sports organizations to the same degree that NCAA programs are scouted, and 
this severely limits the likelihood that an athlete from a semi-professional 
sports league will transition to professional sports.  Furthermore, not all 
NCAA-sanctioned sports have semi-professional equivalents.  As for 
professional sports leagues outside of the United States, reasonable alternative 
market analysis has geographic constraints.  It is unreasonable to force 
student-athletes to leave the country to find an alternative market for NCAA 
intercollegiate athletics.  Accordingly, there is no reasonable substitute market 
for the unique educational and professional development provided by NCAA 
Division I athletics, and those who desire that development have no choice but 
to sign away their likeness rights through Form 11-3a.160  Because student-
athletes have no choice in this matter, there exists a want of genuine consent. 
However, the lack of choice is not the only factor that works against the 
existence of genuine consent with Form 11-3a.  Another problem is found in 
the fact that the terms of Part IV are ambiguous and arguably misleading.  
Earlier it was mentioned that this ambiguity needed to be amended to result in 
the appearance of assent.  The ambiguity problem, however, also affects the 
existence of genuine consent.  Adding to this is the fact that student-athletes 
typically lack the experience with contracts and understanding of commercial 
and intellectual property law.  Not just that, but student-athletes are not even 
represented at the signing by legal counsel to explain to them the significance 
of their signature on Form 11-3a.  How can student-athletes consent to 
something they do not even understand?  How can they consent to terms that 
are unclear to them?   
Accordingly, it is recommended that the NCAA and its member 
 
159. Kaburakis et al., supra note 79, at 18. 
160. Hanlon & Yasser, supra 71, at 291–92. 
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institutions revise Form 11-3a to make clear that it is a permanent assignment 
of name and likeness rights.  It is also recommended that member institutions 
inform student-athletes of the significance of this assignment and afford them 
the benefit of legal representation in this process.  Perhaps schools should 
provide the form to student-athletes and their parents in advance so that they 
can better review the terms of the document and have legal representation 
review it as well.  These measures would enhance student-athlete 
understanding of the document and increase the potential for genuine consent.   
But most importantly, the NCAA and its member institutions should allow 
student-athletes to opt out of Part IV of Form 11-3a.  From a contractual 
perspective, this allowance would infuse some semblance of genuine consent 
into the negotiation of Form 11-3a.  No longer would the provision be forced 
on student-athletes, as they would be permitted to retain their publicity rights 
and still participate in NCAA-sanctioned intercollegiate athletics.  And those 
who grant their rights to the NCAA and its member institutions by agreeing to 
the terms of Part IV will have done so willingly and of their own volition.  
From a practical perspective, allowance of this option also makes sense.  After 
all, neither the NCAA nor its members need student-athlete likeness to operate 
amateur athletics.  Certainly, use would benefit both in promoting events and 
in continuing their relationship with EA Sports, the manufacturer of the 
NCAA Football video game that allegedly uses student-athletes’ likenesses.  
However, the viability and success of intercollegiate athletics does not depend 
upon the assignment of student-athlete likeness through Part IV of Form 11-
3a.  Furthermore, it is possible, if not probable, that a significant number of 
student-athletes will permit their schools and the NCAA to use their names 
and likenesses.  After all, this use promotes the student-athlete in addition to 
the institution, the NCAA, and intercollegiate sport events.  In fact, some 
student-athletes may like the fact that they are featured in promotional 
materials.  This may even hold true for the use of student-athlete likeness in 
EA’s NCAA Football video games because students may enjoy seeing and 
playing with a virtual representation of themselves in the game.  If given a 
choice of being in the game or not, many may elect to allow the use of their 
names and likeness.   
Thus, application of Murray’s consent theory to the negotiation of Form 
11-3a reveals flaws with both apparent assent and genuine consent that merit 
attention if the NCAA and its member institutions are to better protect this 
document and its conveyance of publicity rights.  However, the application 
also reveals that it is very possible for the NCAA and member institutions to 
enhance the existence of apparent assent and genuine consent by: (1) making 
Form 11-3a more detailed and explanatory so that student-athletes know what 
they are signing away, (2) explaining the terms to the student-athletes, (3) 
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allowing (and perhaps even encouraging) legal representation for them when 
they sign the form, and (4) giving student-athletes the option to participate in 
intercollegiate sports without the conveyance.   
B.  Benefits of Consent Enhancement 
There exists both theoretical and empirical support for the use of consent 
enhancement to fortify contracts from unconscionability claims.  In addition to 
Murray’s consent theory to unconscionability, Leff also recognized the idea 
that enhanced consent could be used to protect a bargain.  Leff referred to this 
approach as “super-assent.”161  DiMatteo and Rich also recognized the use of 
consent enhancement under the title “superconscionability.”162  But, in 
addition to a review of relevant literature and case law, DiMatteo and Rich 
also performed a quantitative study, discussed earlier, that utilized consent 
analysis to code 187 cases involving the issue of unconscionability.  The 
results of that study revealed statistical support for the premise that a party 
could better protect a contract through consent-enhancing factors.163  In fact, 
the study found that consent-questioning factors (young or elderly age, lack of 
sophistication, lack of education, low socioeconomic status, low business 
acumen, relative bargaining power, etc.) were nullified by consent-enhancing 
factors (conspicuousness, negotiations, and existence of legal counsel).164  In 
fact, contracts in cases that included some evidence of conspicuousness or 
negotiation were held unconscionable only twenty-two percent of the time.165  
And, not a single contract from the sample population was found 
unconscionable when the challenging party was represented by legal counsel 
at the moment of contract formation.166 
Accordingly, there is empirical support for the NCAA and its member 
institutions infusing Form 11-3a with consent-enhancing elements.  Thus, we 
suggest making the conveyance of publicity rights in Form 11-3a more 
conspicuous, and this modification to the contract would decrease any 
likelihood of unconscionability to only twenty-two percent.  We also suggest 
that member institutions explain the terms and conditions to student-athletes 
so that they know what they are signing.  Further, we suggest that the NCAA 
and its members allow and encourage legal representation for student-athletes 
 
161. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—Consumers and the Common Law 
Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 349–50 (1970). 
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in the negotiation of Form 11-3a.  If legal representation were present in this 
process, then that would align the agreement with those that courts have never 
been found unconscionable.167  Lastly, we suggest the inclusion of an option 
that would allow student-athletes to refuse to release their publicity rights and 
still participate in NCAA intercollegiate athletics.  This option would make 
Part IV of Form 11-3a negotiable.  No longer would it be a contract of 
adhesion.  Instead, there would exist some semblance of actual volition. 
It is true that these remedial, consent-enhancing measures focus primarily 
on the procedural elements of unconscionability.  Thus, Form 11-3a may still 
be vulnerable to claims that the terms of the conveyance in Part IV remain 
grossly one-sided.  After all, the student-athletes receive no additional 
compensation for the release of their publicity rights.  However, the majority 
of cases require some showing of both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability, and these measures would drastically reduce the likelihood 
that the negotiation of Form 11-3a would be deemed procedurally defective.  
Scholars have recognized that student-athlete plaintiffs would have a difficult 
time, an uphill battle even, in convincing a court to find Form 11-3a 
unconscionable.168  This is probably correct given that courts have provided 
the NCAA and its member institutions with “ample latitude” to regulate 
student-athletes.169  That deference could be reinforced with the addition of 
consent-enhancing measures aimed at amplifying the level of student-athlete 
volition in Form 11-3a.  It is very possible that consent-enhancement measures 
taken by the NCAA and its members would make the uphill battle even more 
of a climb, further fortifying Form 11-3a from unconscionability attacks.  
After all, judicial application of the doctrine of unconscionability is 
discretionary.  If the NCAA and its members can convince a court that they 
have taken reasonable steps to educate and protect student-athletes in this 
process, it seems highly unlikely that a court will exercise its equitable 
authority to knock over Part IV of Form 11-3a.   
VI. SUMMARY 
Llewellyn’s vision for the doctrine of unconscionability has come true; 
 
167. See id. 
168. Kaburakis et al., supra note 79, at 18; see also Schmitz, supra note 6, at 91 (discussing how 
courts have allowed cases of contractual unfairness to survive because the two-prong 
unconscionability approach is too rigid for plaintiffs).  
169. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 96 (1984).  For a discussion on 
judicial deference provided to the NCAA, see Baker III et al., supra note 152; Christian Dennie, 
White Out Full Grant-in-Aid: An Antitrust Action the NCAA Cannot Afford to Lose, 7 VA. SPORTS & 
ENT. L.J. 97 (2007). 
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courts have developed a machinery for its application through the use of 
procedural and substantive unconscionability.  But that machinery remains a 
work in progress.  Murray suggested a more contractual approach to the 
doctrine that focused on consent.  While no jurisdiction has followed Murray’s 
lead, the theory continues to draw attention in scholarship on 
unconscionability.170  This article adds to the literature calling for a reform of 
the doctrine of unconscionability through use of Murray’s consent theory.  
Instead, we suggest that the theory can be used to strengthen the evidence of 
both apparent and genuine consent.  In doing so, drafting parties can 
essentially fortify contracts from unconscionability attack because the majority 
of jurisdictions require showings of both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability.  The addition of true volition in the contracting process 
would leave plaintiffs with only substantive grounds for attacking a bargain 
that they willfully agreed upon.  This position has been supported through 
empirical research revealing that the addition of consent-enhancing factors 
nullifies consent-questioning factors.   
It is suggested that the NCAA and its member institutions add consent-
enhancing factors to the negotiation of Form 11-3a.  Specific measures 
include: (1) making Form 11-3a more detailed and explanatory so that student-
athletes know what they are signing away, (2) explaining the terms to the 
student-athletes, (3) allowing (and perhaps even encouraging) legal 
representation for them when they sign the form, and (4) giving student-
athletes the option to participate in intercollegiate sports without the 
conveyance.  By taking these steps, the NCAA and its members would make it 
very difficult for a student-athlete plaintiff, or class thereof, to convince a 
court that the equities favor the application of the unconscionability machine 
to refuse enforcement of Part IV of Form 11-3a.  But, it is also important to 
note that there is another court that should be considered, the court of public 
opinion. 
Critics continue to attack the NCAA and its member institutions for 
exploiting student-athletes.171  They challenge the big business notion of 
 
170. See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 41. 
171. See BILLY HAWKINS, THE NEW PLANTATION: BLACK ATHLETES, COLLEGE SPORTS, AND 
PREDOMINANTLY WHITE NCAA INSTITUTIONS (2010); ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 77 
(1996); Michael P. Acain, Comment, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure for the Exploitation of College 
Athletes, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 307 (1998); Andrew B. Carrabis, Strange Bedfellows: How the 
NCAA and EA Sports May Have Violated Antitrust and Right of Publicity Laws to Make a Profit at 
the Exploitation of Intercollegiate Amateurism, 15 BARRY L. REV. 17 (2010); Christian Dennie, 
Amateurism Stifles a Student-Athlete’s Dream, 12 SPORTS LAW. J. 221 (2005); Hanlon & Yasser, 
supra note 71; Kim Hidlay, Commercial Exploitation of Student-Athletes in Video Games: The Need 
for Revisions in the NCAA Amateurism Bylaws, 1 J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 70 (2009); Wilbert M. Leonard 
II, Exploitation in Collegiate Sport: The Views of Basketball Players in NCAA Divisions I, II, and III, 
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intercollegiate sports and the fact that student-athletes do not receive fair 
compensation for their labors or the use of their names and likeness in 
commercial products.172  If student-athlete plaintiffs were to challenge the 
conscionability of Form 11-3a, that complaint would give critics even more 
fodder for their scrutiny.  This is particularly true given the nature of 
unconscionability, which focuses on fairness in the bargaining process.  If 
Form 11-3a were to be found unconscionable, that finding would imply that 
the NCAA and its member institutions were not fair in their treatment of 
student-athletes and that they took advantage of them.  It is the mission of the 
NCAA to protect its student-athletes,173 including specifically protecting them 
from commercial exploitation.  If the organization and its members want to 
live up to that mission, then they should put before the student-athletes clear 
and understandable contracts that do not conceal important terms and 
conditions.  They should also properly educate student-athletes on the forms 
they sign.  They should encourage student-athletes to rely on the advice of 
counsel when signing important documents that affect their legal rights.  They 
should allow student-athletes to opt out of a transfer of publicity rights that in 
no way limits the NCAA and its members in organizing and operating amateur 
athletics.  They should elect to incorporate these consent-enhancing measures 
not only to strengthen Form 11-3a against claims of unconscionability, but 
also because adding these measures would be a positive step in helping to 












9 J. OF SPORT BEHAV. 11 (1986); John Stieber, The Behavior of the NCAA: A Question of Ethics, 10 
J. BUS. ETHICS 445 (1991). 
172. See Hawkins, supra note 171; Wertheimer, supra note 171, at 77; Acain, supra note 171; 
Carrabis, supra note 171; Dennie, supra note 171; Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 71, Hidlay, supra 
note 171; Leonard, supra note 171; Stieber, supra note 171. 
173. See About the NCAA: Core Values, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are/core+values+landing+page (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). 
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APPENDIX 1 
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